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PRIOR RESTRAINT
IN WARTIME
Instrumental Justifications For The Protection
Of Speech Are Especially Compelling
In A Time Of War
By Paul E. Salamanca
umerous justifications are
given for the protection of
speech. Most depend
upon its instrumental value; others
depend upon its intrinsic value. For
example, many have argued that we
protect speech because it facilitates
elective democracy.1 Because the
people are the ultimate government in
a democracy, they must have free
access to ideas and information.
Otherwise they will make uninformed
choices and be incapable of articulat-
ing their concerns to each other and
to public officials. Others have
argued that we protect speech to
ensure an unrestrained "marketplace
of ideas" in which good ideas will
drive out bad ones, and in which truth
will be the residue of a lengthy
contest between rival proposals.2
Finally, mindful of the intrinsic value
of speech, some have argued that we
protect speech because it promotes
individual development -because it
serves as a means of "self-actualiza-
tion."3
Instrumental justifications for the
protection of speech are especially
compelling in a time of war. War is a
time of exigency, of felt necessity. It
is a relatively poor answer to an
asserted governmental need to
suppress speech in a time of exigency
that the would-be speaker has a
personal call to expression, however
compelling that call might be in a
subjective sense. Far more persua-
sive is the answer that, as a matter of
exigency, a polity needs expression as
much in wartime as in a time of
peace, if not more.
Expression has profound instru-
mental value in drawing every sector
of a polity into public matters. While
a govrn en tha
our soldiers and sailors are engaging
an enemy overseas, we can feel
involved - and perhaps be involved -
by keeping track of what our military
is doing, by engaging our friends and
colleagues in discussion as to the
wisdom of our nation's acts, and by
offering our suggestions as to how a
war might better be prosecuted - or,
for that matter, why a war ought not
to be prosecuted. The greatest
military strength of a democracy is
that, once roused, a high percentage
of its population is capable of moving
behind a war effort. Similar state-
ments cannot be made about political
systems in which the citizenry does
not identify with the government or
with its objectives.
In addition, a government that
operates in a milieu of free, private
expression has an enormous claim to
credibility that is not available to a
repressive state. When the citizenry
of a country believes that the media is
sufficiently intrusive and powerful to
expose official deception, a concomi-
tant belief arises that the government
will be deterred from engaging in such
deception. Of course, this argument
must not be taken too far. Public
officials have infamously misjudged
their ability to prevent the media from
exposing their failings and deceptions.
But the lesson to such officials must
be clear in the aggregate: a large
fraction of deception relating to highly
important matters will eventually be
discovered by a free media, with a
high cost to pay if the deception hurts
the nation in a material way. Given
the general appreciation of this fact,
the public will have reason to trust the
pronouncements of the government in
a milieu of open discussion of ideas
and dissemination of information.
n light of these considerations,
a wartime government checked
by a powerful, free media is
able to speak to the electorate with a
high degree of credibility. Requests
for patience, calm, and sacrifice are
more likely to be acceded to.' This is
not to say that the government is
incapable of abusing or simply
mishandling its ability to inform and
engage the electorate, but the ex-
cesses of the government are more
likely to arise from poor judgment
than from outright attempts to de-
ceive.
Despite the foregoing justifications
for a free media in a time of war, we
must remember that such a media is
not self-actuating. The bar and the
bench play important roles in promot-
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ing and protecting a free media. In
fact, it is imperative that the bar stand
up to vindicate the rights of free
expression in times of national
emergency, and that the bench uphold
the constitutional rights of the media
against unjustifiable regulation. This
is not simply a matter of protecting
the media for its own sake. Although
expression has intrinsic value, it also
has instrumental value. As I have
argued, the courts do no one a favor
- including public officials - by
permitting arbitrary restraints on free
expression.Although the focus of this
essay is on prior restraint-
1 governmental orders that
prevent speech from occurring on an
ex ante basis - regulation of the
media can also take the form of
punishment after the fact. Indeed,
one could plausibly argue that these
two forms of regulation present
comparable threats to the free
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exchange of information. After all,
threats of punishment after the fact
can deter the media from disseminat-
ing information just as surely as a prior
restraint prevents such dissemination
in the first place.5 But prior restraints
present at least two dangers that are
not readily presented by after-the-fact
punishment.
First, prior restraints often consist
of judicial orders, which cannot
ordinarily be tested on constitutional
grounds because of the collateral bar
rule. Under this rule, a person who
violates a judicial order is generally not
permitted to argue as a defense to a
citation for contempt that the order
abridged a constitutional right. As the
U.S. Supreme Court explained in
Walker v. City of Birmingham, 6 a
case from the civil rights movement
that reiterated the collateral bar rule,
"respect for judicial process is a small
price to pay for the civilizing hand of
law, which alone can give abiding
meaning to constitutional freedom."7
Because of this rule, a judicially
imposed prior restraint that appears to
violate the Constitution may not be
ignored and later tested in the same
way as similarly defective legislation.
Second, prior restraints - unless
they are flouted - deprive the media
of the option of disseminating informa-
tion notwithstanding the threat of
sanction.8 Although the media may
choose to squelch a story to avoid
exposure to liability, even in the
absence of a prior restraint, such a
decision would lie outside the
government's hands. Leaving the
decision with the media is generally
preferable. Because the media has an
economic and professional incentive to
disseminate information, as well as a
counteracting incentive to avoid
punishment, it can be counted on to
give proper weight to all consider-
ations. The government, by contrast,
may lose sight of the long-term value
of sharing information with the public.
If so, it cannot generally be relied
upon to strike the proper balance
between allowing expression and
imposing restraint.9
his is not to say that the
government should never be
able to restrain the dissemi-
nation of information. As Professor
Chemerinsky has argued, even free-
speech absolutists surely would have
permitted the government to enjoin
disclosure of the fact that the Allies
had broken the Nazi code.10 But the
government's burden in justifying such
measures must be exceedingly heavy.
And in fact it is. As a matter of
settled constitutional law, it is very
difficult for the government to restrain
the media, even in a time of war. The
seminal case in the area is New York
Times Co. v. United States." At
issue in that case was an attempt by
the Nixon Administration to suppress
the "Pentagon Papers," a classified
history of the Vietnam War that had
been compiled by the Department of
Defense and leaked to the press. In a
short per curiam opinion, the Supreme
Court held that the Papers could not
be suppressed." There were six
concurring and three dissenting
opinions.
For the most part, the concurring
justices came out strongly in favor of
protecting the press. In fact, Justices
Black and Douglas seemed to reject
out of hand the very idea of a prior
restraint. 3 Similarly, although the
other concurring justices indicated a
willingness to uphold a prior restraint
in dire circumstances, none found
such circumstances to exist in the
case at bar. Justice Brennan, for
example, set forth the exacting
standard that "only governmental
allegation and proof that publication
must inevitably, directly, and immedi-
ately cause the occurrence of an
event kindred to imperiling the safety
of a transport already at sea can
support even the issuance of an
interim restraining order."' 4 Likewise,
although Justice Stewart was "con-
vinced" that publication of certain of
the Papers would harm the national
interest, he nevertheless concurred in
the per curiam opinion, reasoning that
such publication would not "surely
result in direct, immediate, and
irreparable damage to our Nation or
its people."15 Justice White also
acknowledged that a prior restraint
could constitutionally issue in the
appropriate circumstances, but
concluded that the government had
failed to discharge the "very heavy
burden" against such a restraint in the
case before the Court.
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A theme that ran just below
/ the surface in four of the
1. .Lfirst five concurring
opinions, and that dominated Justice
Marshall's concurrence, was the
absence of specific congressional
authority for the injunction that the
Nixon Administration sought.17 Given
this theme, the Pentagon Papers
Case gave rise to a separation of
powers spin to the prior restraint
debate, at least in situations implicat-
ing national security. This spin later
played out in United States v. The
Progressive, Inc. 8
The issue in Progressive was
whether a periodical could publish an
article entitled "The H-Bomb Secret:
How We Got It, Why We're Telling
It," which purported to describe in
detail how a hydrogen-bomb works.
Indeed, in the opinion of government,
the article contained a significant
amount of restricted data, notwith-
standing the fact that its author lacked
security clearance. 9 Distinguishing
the Pentagon Papers Case, the U.S.
District Court for the Western District
of Wisconsin acceded to the
government's request for interim
injunctive relief.2° In granting this
request, the district court laid great
stress on the fact that two specific
provisions of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954 appeared to authorize the
government to seek equitable relief in
a case like the one at bar.21 The
court also held that the government
had met the precise constitutional
standard for justifying a prior restraint
set by Justices Brennan and Stewart
in the Pentagon Papers Case, by
demonstrating "grave, direct, immedi-
ate and irreparable harm to the United
States" in the event of publication.22
Scholars have supposed, however,
that the Progressive judge was using
the word "immediate" loosely, for
there was little reason to believe that
publication of the article would cause
immediate nuclear proliferation. The
judge seems to have compensated for
this deficiency by stressing the
enormity of the consequences were
an unfriendly power eventually to
develop a thermonuclear device,
noting that:
A mistake in ruling
against the United States
could pave the way for
thermonuclear
annihilation for us all.
In that event, our right to
life is extinguished and
the right to publish
becomes moot.2
3
Ironically, the case was dismissed
as moot on appeal because another
periodical published a lengthy letter
that was substantively similar to the
enjoined article.
24
In light of the high bar for prior
restraints set by the Pentagon
Papers Case, as well as the
government's inability to suppress the
article at issue in The Progressive -
even with an injunction in hand - it is
hard to imagine how the government
could effectively control the media
through the courts. Indeed, the reality
of the situation often leads to negotia-
tion rather than a standoff in court.2
In the vast majority of cases, this is
clearly a desirable outcome. After all,
the media is part of the polity, and
there is no clear reason to assume
that the media will be insensitive to an
urgent need for secrecy set forth by
the government.26
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was simply not created for atheists
or agnostics, and we certainly do
not have to cater to them in our
law and government. That would
be turning America on its head.
Finally, I believe that Lemon and
Stone are both bad law, and should
be reversed. Lemon has fallen into
disuse and has been criticized
greatly over the years. Stone was
not even argued or briefed before
the Court. It is now time for the
Supreme Court to clarify this area
of the law with a new and wise
decision, based on the principles
that made America great. There is
no concrete "wall of separation
between church and state" and
government must not be hostile to
religion. Rather, there should be a
partnership between church and
state, where the state honors the
church and all it has done and all it
can do for our country.
Sincerely,
Judge John Marshall Meisburg, Jr.
